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Abstract 
We discuss the role of stigma in the sale of sexual services and the effect that policies increasing 
stigma have on sex markets and the welfare of the actors therein, presenting the different sides 
to the debate and the evidence in their support. We then examine changes in legislation in the 
United Kingdom, which ended the relatively permissive regime established with the 
Wolfenden Report of 1960, to a much harder line aiming to crack down on prostitution with 
the Prostitution (Public Places) Scotland Act 2007 and the Policing and Crime Act of 2009 in 
England and Wales. We make use of two waves of the British National Survey of Sexual 
Attitudes and Lifestyles, a representative sample of the British population (Natsal2, conducted 
in 2000-2001 and Natsal3, conducted in 2010-2012) to investigate changes in both the amount 
and composition of demand for paid sexual services between the two waves, and draw some 
implications on the likely welfare effects of considering prostitution a form of crime. 
JEL Codes: C35, J16, J22, K42.  
 
1. Introduction 
The sale of sexual services is an activity carried out by women, men, and transgender 
individuals mostly, although not exclusively, to cater for male demand (Cunningham and Shah, 
2016). It has been widely studied in the social sciences along a variety of dimensions including 
violence, immigration, and sex tourism (Thorbek and Pattanaik 2002; Sánchez Taylor and 
O’Connell Davidson 2010), identity and rights (Pheterson 1995 Brewis and Linstead 2000), 
drug abuse, HIV risks, and regulatory concerns (Della Giusta and Munro 2008; Scoular 2010). 
Many social scientists have also taken a critical approach to the rhetoric around trafficking and 
slavery (Agustín 2007; Kempadoo et al. 2011; O’Connell Davidson 2014; Weitzer 2014, 
2015a, 2015b), and the significant dangers stemming from debates equating all forms of female 
migration to work in the sex industry with trafficking, and all trafficking with slavery. 
The question of how to regulate prostitution and whether it is or not a criminal activity has 
long been debated and diverse agendas about gender equality, the regulation of sexuality, 
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personal self-determination, state protectionism, public nuisance and socio-economic disparity 
are all reflected in legal and policy responses at national state level, as well as the very name 
the activity takes. The language of ‘prostitute’ and ‘prostitution’ is typically aligned with 
abolitionist perspectives that see the sale of sex as entailing women’s exploitation and 
objectification, both by those who manage and create the opportunity for the sexual transaction 
as well as by those clients who make the purchase and maintain the demand. The language of 
‘sex workers’ and ‘sex work’ has typically been preferred by those who emphasise women’s 
agency in entering into commercial sex transactions (albeit under conditions of constraint) and 
who call for the regulation of the sale of sex as akin to the sale of non-sexual labour or services. 
We deliberately use the two terms interchangeably in our work, as taking positions in the 
ideological debate is not our scope (Weitzer, 2005, presents an excellent summary of the 
arguments of both sides). In the remainder of the paper we firstly discuss the regulation of 
prostitution, then we present economic models of paid sex (section 3) and show to what extent 
they help understand this activity, and the central roles of stigma and agency (which we argue 
provides the ability to resist stigma). We then discuss how these models can be used to analyse 
policyand to what extent they predict what is observed empirically. In part 4 we present our 
analysis of the changes in demand that have taken place in the UK over the period 2000-2012, 
during which prostitution was progressively criminalised. 
2. Evidence on the regulation of prostitution 
Euchner and Knill (2015) have attempted to characterise the evolution of regulation of 
prostitution in Western Europe since the 1960s, and noted that whilst until the late 1990s 
national rules converged on the paradigm that they define of ‘permission without recognition’ 
(prohibition of brothels and profit oriented third party activity but allowing activity in flats and 
on streets), a marked change has since occurred with countries diverging substantially. 
Germany, the Netherlands and Greece have moved towards acknowledging prostitution as a 
regular job on one side, and Sweden, Norway and Finland have hardened their stance instead 
moving to abolitionism, the aim to eradicate prostitution which is considered tantamount to a 
form of violence. In the first group of countries, the consideration of sex work as legitimate 
labour has led to shifting bans on outdoor and indoor prostitution subject to compliance with 
regulations (Netherlands since 2000, Germany since 2002). Sex workers are entitled to a 
number of employment related protections under the law, and local authorities required to 
ensure that brothels are suitably licensed and operating in accordance with relevant health and 
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safety requirements. The abolitionist model, conversely, seeks to prohibit prostitution, facilitate 
exit and punish clients and has applied in varying degrees in the United States and, more 
recently, Sweden, Norway and Finland. In Sweden it is an offence, punishable by a fine or 
imprisonment for up to six months, to obtain a casual sexual relationship for payment. Both 
outdoor and indoor prostitution are prohibited, although only the clients will be criminalised. 
As a result, the spotlight shines squarely on the purchaser of commercial sex, and on 
criminalising his role (it is thought to be always a he, though both women and couples purchase 
sex) in creating demand for the sex industry. A key rationale behind this is that prostitution is 
a central manifestation of male violence against women, which in turn means that those who 
sell sex should not themselves be punished, since they are victims rather than criminals. True 
gender equality, it is argued, is attainable only when men are no longer permitted to buy, sell 
and exploit women in prostitution, and the Swedish government has coupled this legislative 
initiative with a number of outreach programmes designed to assist women who wish to leave 
the industry. Intermediate options continue to exists, as exemplified by the approach of 
decriminalisation adopted for example in New Zealand, which since 2003 has decriminalised 
a range of offences that were related to selling sex such as soliciting, brothel-keeping, procuring 
intercourse. Brothels in NZ are not subjected to any specific state licensing system, but are 
governed by the usual employment and health regulations that apply to other businesses. 
Soliciting has been decriminalised and there are no legal impediments to recruiting clients in 
public bars or hotels. In passing these reforms, the New Zealand Government emphasised that 
its aim was not to legitimise prostitution but to offer to those who worked in the industry an 
improved level of protection and eradicate the barriers to exiting prostitution, such as may be 
created by a criminal conviction. 
The effects of the different regulatory regimes on the extent of the market and the welfare 
of those involved have been widely studied, although the lack of reliable data is often 
mentioned as a significant obstacle. It has for example been argued that women working in 
toleration zones or regulated brothels (in the Netherlands or Germany, for example) are less 
marginalised and better off (both personally and financially) than outside (Euchner and Knill, 
2015). However, it has also been observed that many sex workers in Germany remain 
unregistered - often for tax reasons – and that experience in the Netherlands suggests that the 
transition to a license-based regime has had negative side-effects: in particular, establishing 
regulatory systems and policing toleration zones has imposed hefty demands on state agencies 
and it has been suggested that the most vulnerable women (e.g. those with irregular migration 
4 
 
status or drug addictions) have been pushed into illegal sectors where there is no protection. 
There have been problems in finding a suitable location for toleration zones, and it has been 
argued that many clients – preferring to remain anonymous - will be reluctant to frequent more 
visible areas, creating inevitable demand for unregulated arenas. While offering the benefits 
associated with the reduction of sex work stigma and the greater visibility of sex workers 
(which is thought to render them less vulnerable to abuse), it has been argued that 
decriminalisation may offer the added advantage of limiting state intrusion into the private lives 
of sex workers, and permitting them greater flexibility in their working practices (Della Giusta, 
2010).  
No agreement exists on the consequences of decriminalisation on demand (New Zealand 
Ministry of Justice, 2008 suggests demand has fallen; Farley, 2010 suggests it has increased 
but cannot provide supporting evidence). Similarly, supporters of the abolitionist approach cite 
its impact on demand, arguing that there has been a marked decline in the number of prostitutes 
working on Swedish streets, but there is also evidence that online prostitution has increased 
enormously and that there has been cross-border displacement too. One of the risks of 
abolitionism is that it may simply force relocation to less visible sites in which sex workers 
may be at increased risk of abuse, or drawn into a more competitive market in which they have 
to cut prices or offer riskier services to secure the business of a decreasing client base, and 
controversy rages over which effect has been prevalent in Sweden and neighbouring countries, 
as reported in The Home Affairs Committee Prostitution Enquiry Report published in July 
20161.  
The UK has moved from a relatively permissive regime under the Wolfenden Committee 
Report in the late 1950s, according to which prostitution itself was not illegal, although many 
of the activities that facilitate or flow from both its street and off-street manifestations 
                                                 
1 http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201617/cmselect/cmhaff/26/2607.htm#footnote-046 
The Swedish Sex Purchase Act: Where Does it Stand? Charlotta Holmström og May-Len 
Skilbreihttps://www.idunn.no/oslo_law_review/2017/02/the_swedish_sex_purchase_act_where_does_it_stand 
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(including soliciting, kerb-crawling, controlling prostitution for gain, etc.) were criminalised, 
to a much harder line of aiming to crack down on prostitution with the Policing and Crime Act 
of 2009. As discussed in Della Giusta and Munro (2008) and Della Giusta (2009), the 
regulatory framework within which prostitution takes place in England and Wales has 
undergone significant changes in recent years and taken a decisively abolitionist turn, as the 
Swedish approach became popular with British policy makers. In 2004 the government 
conducted the Paying the Price consultation and the resulting legislation sought to introduce a 
markedly more negative stance towards the industry and clients in particular, and a view of sex 
workers as essentially victims. The Home Office prostitution Strategy for England and Wales 
(2006) contained as a key element ‘tackling demand’, which was seen alongside ‘reducing 
supply’ as crucial to eradicating street prostitution and challenging the view that street 
prostitution is inevitable. The Strategy formally endorsed measures such as prosecutions under 
the kerb crawling legislation, local media campaigns including ‘naming and shaming’ and 
‘kerb crawler re-education programs’. The Strategy also gave room to the implementation, in 
several parts of the country, of a raft of prosecution for kerb crawling offences, under the Sexual 
Offences Act 1985. The Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001 strengthened the previous 
regulation and made the offence arrest able, giving the courts have the power to disqualify 
drivers. Similarly, in October 2007, the policing Minister in Northern Ireland announced that 
kerb crawling would be introduced into law as a specific offence. In Scotland, the Prostitution 
(Public Places) Scotland Act 2007 came into force in October 2007; it criminalised ‘loitering 
or soliciting in any public place for the purpose of obtaining the services of someone engaged 
in prostitution.’ (Sanders and Campbell, 2008). Finally, the Policing and Crime Act of 2009 
includes a number of provisions including criminalization of soliciting and making it illegal to 
pay for services from a prostitute whom a third person has subjected to force, threats, coercion 
or deception to perform those services, irrespective of whether the customer knew or could 
have known about this exploitation and of the country where the sexual services are provided. 
Campaigning is now calling for paying for sex to be made a crime. The policy emphasises the 
harms that are deemed to be inherent in prostitution and insists that those who sell sex should 
be seen primarily as victims – unless and until they fall foul of this categorisation by refusing 
assistance to ‘exit’ and opting instead (whether by choice or circumstance) to continue to sell 
sex. In addition, it is based on the abolitionist conviction that reduction of women’s 
involvement in sex work can be achieved by stricter enforcement of kerb-crawling laws that 
target clients.  
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The effects on sex workers have been very significant: Sanders and Campbell (2008) 
illustrate the implications of this shift for the rights, safety and working conditions of sex 
workers and the increase in their stigmatization. Here we want to see what has happened to the 
officially intended target of the policy that is demand. We exploit two waves of the nationally 
representative British National Survey of Sexual Attitudes and Lifestyles based on interviews 
in the period 2000-2001 (Natsal 2) and 2010–2012 (Natsal 3) and look for any changes in the 
extent and composition of demand that can be detected.  
3. Economic models of prostitution 
Whilst moral philosophers and sociologists regularly engage in debates on 
commodification (see e.g. Sandel, 2012), economists have traditionally kept to their 
consequentialist moral stance and focused on finding the best way to make ‘morally repugnant’ 
transactions that have a benefit happen without eliciting such repugnance (Healy and Krawiec, 
2017). Historical examples are the debates on blood donations (Titmuss, 1971; Arrow, 1972; 
Singer, 1973) and more recently on incentives to donate human organs (Cohen 1989; 
Hansmann 1989; Blair and Kaserman 1991; Kaserman and Barnett 2002), all of which, Healy 
and Krawiec point out, have stalled in the face of the difficulty of attributing moral costs against 
the benefits flowing from the trade, so that the more recent literature has instead focused on 
reducing the repugnance itself through adequate institutional design (e.g. Roth’s in kind kidney 
exchange system; Roth, 2007), or reframing (Fiske and Tetlock 1997), management of negative 
effects through “relational work” (Zelizer 2005), or outright obfuscation (Rossman 2014). 
When it comes to the regulation of prostitution, a recent contribution by Lacetera et al (2017) 
focussing on the link between levels of economic development and the regulation of morally 
contentious activities (including abortion, surrogacy and prostitution) find that for prostitution 
there is an association between higher income per capita and legalisation, but it is actually not 
a very strong relationship and historical cultural and political factors play an important role (for 
example, countries with a majority of Catholics legislate less often on markets for sex, but are 
also more likely to allow non-organized forms of prostitution, democratic countries and 
countries with more gender political equality allow more prostitution but not if it is perceived 
as a form of exploitation). Unsurprisingly, the economic literature has focused on more 
standard economic issues related to both selling and buying sex: prices and supply 
characteristics (Samuel Cameron, Alan Collins and Neill Thew et al 1999; Peter Moffatt and 
Simon Peters 2001; Lena Edlund and Evelyn Korn 2002; Samuel Cameron, 2002), demand 
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determinants (Samuel Cameron and Alan Collins 2003), health risks and the effect of condom 
use on sex workers’ earnings (Vijayendra Rao, Indrani Gupta, Michael Lokshin and Smarajit 
Jana 2001; Paul Gertler, Manisha Shah and Stefano Bertozzi 2003), the evolution of paid sex 
markets and the ways in which urban spaces favour sexual transactions (Alan Collins 2004), 
the effect of men in transit on the demand for paid sex (Scott Cunningham and Todd Kendall, 
2011), the connections with trafficking (Maura Laura Di Tommaso, Isilda Shima, Steinar 
Strøm and Francesca Bettio, 2009), the role of asymmetric information and transaction costs 
in bargaining over price and working conditions (Debra Satz, 2010; Neha Hui 2012; Amy 
Farmer and Andrew Horowitz, 2013). Compensation has been linked to compensation for 
social exclusion, risk (violence, disease, arrest, punishment), front loading in wage profile 
(informal pension scheme or insurance), boredom and physical effort, distaste (potential 
psychological and physical costs), loss of recreational sex pleasure, and anti-social and 
inconvenient hours, and, more controversially, the wages of sex workers have been described 
as 'high' for a 'low skill' occupation and explained by the loss of position in the marriage market 
(Edlund and Korn, 2002).  
Not many studies have focussed on the demand side in great detail. However, existing 
studies of clients suggest that personal characteristics (personal and family background, self-
perception, perceptions of women, sexual preferences), economic factors (education, income, 
work), as well as attitudes towards risk (health hazard and risk of being caught where sex work 
is illegal), lack of interest in conventional relationships, desire for variety in sexual acts or 
sexual partners, and viewing sex as a commodity, are all likely in different ways to affect 
demand. The connection between the effort and costs associated with finding a sexual partner 
who would readily satisfy their sexual preferences, and the straightforward and readily 
accessible option of sex work features in motivations of male sex workers’ clients in the UK 
(Coy, Horvath and Kelly, 2007; Campbell, 1998 and Sanders 2008), and in men and women 
clients in Australia (Pitts et al, 2004). Clients differ widely in their views: Monto (2004) finds 
that clients of street sex workers in the US are not particularly sexist, whereas conservative 
views and viewing sex workers as socially inferior feature in accounts of sex tourists, both 
female and male sex (Thorbek and Pattanaik, 2002; Sanchez Taylor, 2001; Marttila; 2003). 
The phenomenon is obviously not limited to paid sex exchanges and widely documented across 
a range of personal services (see e.g. Ehrenreich and Hochschild, 2003) in which inequality 
appears to be at the core of the relationship: prejudices that allow the stigmatisation of another 
person as fundamentally “different” and inferior to oneself appear again and again in 
customers’ accounts (Ben-Israel et al. 2005; Pitts et al 2004; Kern 2000; Blanchard 1994).  
8 
 
Significantly, neither this research on Australia, nor our work on the US (Della Giusta et al., 
2007) found significant differences between men who had paid for sex and those who had not, 
but these were selected samples. When analysing representative samples of the population 
which contain both clients and non-clients differences begin to emerge (Della Giusta et al., 
2016a and 2016b), and one can see clearly that sociodemographic, degree of conservativism 
and risk attitudes all play an important role in identifying different types of demand.  
Interestingly, some of the central tenets of theories of crime do not hold with respect to 
prostitution: for example, whilst the effect of other risky behaviours on demand for paid sex is 
the one expected from the crime literature (that is they are positively correlated), the effect of 
education is often irrelevant or even opposite to what the crime literature typically finds: 
criminals tend to be less educated than the rest of the population (Harlow, 2003, Machin et al., 
2011; Buonanno and Leonida, 2006; Hjalmarsson, et al. 2015) and, following Becker’s model 
(1996) education should increase the opportunity cost of paying for sex and improve self-
control (as well as increase the availability of other opportunities for sex, and the awareness of 
health risks), but this is not found empirically.  
The general economic model of the market for prostitution we developed (see Della Giusta 
et al, 2009) attempts to take these stylised fact into account, hypothesises that paid sex and 
freely exchanged sex are not perfect substitutes, and gives stigma and the capacity to resist it a 
central role. This resistance to stigma (which we called reputational capacity in our original 
model and discussed as a parameter) can be easily linked to agency, since the latter is what on 
the one hand mitigates the effects of stigmatisation and on the other allows to clearly identify 
the role of individual factors in determining the conditions of the transaction. The role of 
agency and resistance to stigma for sex workers has been extensively discussed in terms of 
both the characteristics of the workers themselves (gender, age, ethnicity, appearance, drug 
addiction, family status, etc.) and the segments and locations in which they operate (Della 
Giusta, 2010; Weitzer, 2005) Clients’ agency, which in respect to consumption of paid sex 
refers specifically to their ability to deploy strategies to consume paid sex when this is 
stigmatised and how they change if stigmatisation increases or decreases, has been less the 
focus of discussion, although there are papers discussing the effects of criminalization on 
clients (Sanders and Campbell, 2008). In our model all agents care about their reputations 
because they derive direct material and immaterial utility (it is desired per se and can be used 
to access other earning opportunities) from a positive evaluation by others in the social groups 
they belong to (Granovetter 1985; Mansky 2000), and secondly, because they are aware of the 
costs that social sanctions may impose on their material progress (Akerlof 1980; Arnott and 
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Stiglitz 1991). The model considers both the case in which reputational endowments are 
exogenous (that is not affected by behaviour within the sex industry) and the situation when 
those endowments are endogenous, that is a situation in which if a higher quantity of 
prostitution is sold or bought in the economy the stigma effect decreases, following Akerlof’s 
theory of social custom (Akerlof 1980). Our model predicts that client will participate in the 
‘market’ for paid sex if their marginal willingness to pay for exceeds the price of paid sex, plus 
the marginal costs of a worsened reputation. The higher their ability to resists stigma (R), which 
in turn depends on both the level of stigma associated with the activity and their own agency, 
the lower is the marginal cost from reputation effects of consuming prostitution, and the more 
likely it is that prostitution is consumed. On the supply side, an individual will start to sell sex 
if the price of paid sex exceeds its opportunity cost, again in terms of reputation and alternative 
uses of one’s time: the higher the price of paid sex, the more likely it is that an individual will 
supply prostitution; the lower the availability of alternative income, the more likely it is that 
the individual will take part in the prostitution industry; and the lower the effect of stigma on 
sex workers (again depending on the level of stigma associated with the activity and their 
agency), the more likely it is that prostitution will be sold. The equilibrium amount of 
prostitution sold and bought in the market (S*) is a function of the exogenous parameters: 
ability to resist stigma of sex workers (Rp) and clients (Rc) and other sources of income for sex 
workers (Hp). The table below describes the changes in both quantity and price (w) of 
prostitution that result from increases in reputations and alternative earnings, the key policy 
parameters that regulation typically aims to address. 
  
Table 1. Changes in supply and wages of sex workers resulting from increases in reputation 
capacities and other earning options 
 Rc Rp Hp 
S* + + + 
W + - - 
 
Column 2 shows that clients with high resistance to stigma buy more sex and are also 
prepared to pay more for it (wealthy clients of expensive escort agencies are a case in point as 
the agencies ensure less stigmatization but this is only accessible through high prices). Column 
3 suggests that if sex workers have high resistance to stigma they will sell more sex but for 
lower prices (temporary immigrant sex workers in Europe who aim to work in prostitution only 
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for a limited amount of time to accumulate savings and then return to their country as in 
Thorbeke and Pattanaik 2002; and Corso and Trifirò 2003). Column 4 states that the fewer the 
alternative earning opportunities (Hp high), the more sex is sold at a lower price. 
Following abolitionists line of reasoning, keeping constant the individual resistance to 
stigma, and the rate of substitution in demand between paid and unpaid sex, our model predicts 
that policies that increase the stigma associated with prostitution decrease the marginal net gain 
of supplying prostitution, and the marginal willingness to pay for prostitution. This should, in 
a closed economy, have the effect of decreasing the price of prostitution and, given the same 
availability of alternative earning opportunities (if there are constant intermediation margins), 
also the quantity supplied. Of course, in an open economy, immigration of illegal workers and 
out-migration of clients (sex tourism), might mitigate some of these effects.  
Stigmatisation though is mediated by clients' ability to resist it: less risk averse clients may 
be less deterred by the hardened consequences of being caught and crowd out more risk averse 
clients who might be displaced to other less risky forms of sex consumption. Similarly, sex 
workers might respond to increased stigmatisation by either finding other less risky ways of 
supplying their clients (moving indoors, using internet and using client profiling) whilst those 
less able to resist stigma (and more vulnerable) might find themselves exposed to much worse 
working conditions (heightened risks from operating the selection of clients). Cunnigham and 
Shah (2017) have exploited the fact that a Rhode Island District Court judge unexpectedly 
decriminalized indoor sex work to provide causal estimates of the impact of decriminalization 
on the composition of the sex market, reported rape offenses, and sexually transmitted 
infections, and found that, in line with our model predictions, decriminalization increases the 
size of the indoor sex market, and, again in line with our model predictions, there is a fall in 
both reported rape offenses and a decline in female gonorrhoea incidence. We are not able to 
conduct a similar causa exercise here, but we have conversely the benefit of representative 
data, which we believe illustrates the same effect (in the opposite direction of course) for the 
United Kingdom and lends further support to both our theory, and the idea that stigmatization 
is a dangerous route to pursue. 
 
4. Criminalising prostitution in the UK: changes in demand. 
4.1 The data 
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The National Surveys of Sexual Attitudes and Lifestyles ('Natsal') are stratified probability 
sample surveys of the general population, resident in Britain2. There have been three Natsal in 
1990, 2000, and 2010, conducted by UCL in partnership the National Centre for Social 
Research and the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine. The first Natsal survey, 
conducted 1990-1991, was one of the largest of its kind internationally. 18,876 men and women 
aged 16-59 years were interviewed for 'Natsal-1’, with results published in 'Sexual Attitudes 
and Lifestyles' (Johnson et al., 1994). A second Natsal survey was conducted in 1999-2001 
('Natsal-2’). 11,161 people aged 16-44 years were interviewed as a 'core' sample, and an 
additional 949 people of Black African, Black Caribbean, Indian, and Pakistani ethnicity 
interviewed as part of an ethnic minority boost sample. The third Natsal survey (‘Natsal-3') 
was conducted in 2010-2012. More than 15,000 people aged 16-74 years were interviewed.  
 
Ward et al. (2005) found using Natsal 1 and 2 that there had been an increase in sexually 
transmitted infections and risky sexual behaviours, and found an increase in the number of men 
reporting paying for heterosexual sex, with the typical client being between 25 years and 34 
years, never or previously married, and living in London, and no association with ethnicity, 
social class, homosexual contact, or injecting drug use. They also found that men who paid for 
sex were more likely to report 10 or more sexual partners in the previous 5 years and that only 
a minority of their lifetime sexual partners (19.3%) were commercial, with only 15% reported 
having had an HIV test. Jones et al (2014) focused on the role of men who pay for sex in 
Natsal3 in the diffusion of sexually transmitted infections (STI) and found that men who pay 
for sex also report high numbers of partners more generally and thus are an important core 
group in STI transmission, thus potentially posing a public health hazard. 
Here we focus instead on Natsal 2 and 3, and exploit the change in regulation which came 
into effect with the Policing and Crime Act of 2009, which criminalized soliciting, and made 
it illegal to pay for services from a prostitute whom a third person has subjected to force, 
threats, coercion or deception to perform those services, irrespective of whether the customer 
knew or could have known about this exploitation and of the country where the sexual services 
are provided. The act3 also included a number of provisions aimed at sex workers which have 
sought to differentiate between those willing to exit the industry and those who continued to 
be involved, regardless of alternative earning opportunities available for them with an increase 
                                                 
2 http://www.ucl.ac.uk/iph/research/sexualhealthandhiv/tabs01/tab01 
3 http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2009/26/contents 
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in stigmatisation for those remaining in the trade that has been documented by Sanders and 
Campbell (2008).  
As already discussed, Scotland has been pursuing an independent prostitution policy which 
punishes kerb crawling, soliciting and loitering for the purposes of prostitution, and in the 
Prostitution (Public Places) Scotland Act 2007 has introduced criminalisation of ‘loitering or 
soliciting in any public place for the purpose of obtaining the services of someone engaged in 
prostitution.’ Scotland has since attempted to pursue both the introduction of Prostitution 
Tolerance Zones, as well as criminalise clients, but both have failed to become law. In practice, 
as both policy changes occur in the period intervening the two waves of Natsal, we cannot 
make use of the two years in which difference in difference methods would have been 
appropriate as there is no data on clients for that time. 
 
As the focus here is on demand, in what follows we make use of the sample aged 25-44 
for both Natsal2 and Natsal3, given Natsal2 had an upper age limit of 44. We focus on 
respondents aged 25+ as they should have finished their education. Respondents are asked if 
they have ever paid for sex (homosexual or heterosexual) and asked when they last paid for 
sex, grouped into: the last year, in the last five years, and longer than 5 years ago. Since only a 
few men report paying for sex in the last year (91 in Natsal2 and 71 in Natsal3), we focus on 
the last five years as a more recent demand for sex. We also divide those who have ever paid 
sex into experimenters (only ever paid for sex with 1 partner) and regulars (paid for sex with 
more than 1 partner). For the age range we have sample size of 3,523 for Natsal2 and 2,149 for 
Natsal3. The sample size is larger for Natsal2 due to the fact only those aged 16-44 were 
interviewed, whilst Natsal 3 asked those aged 16-74. Weights are provided for unequal 
selection probability, and we make use of these where possible as robustness checks. We run 
separate models for Natsal2 and Natsal3 as the sampling methods were different and the sample 
age ranges were different (although we do restrict the sample age range for Natsal3). We want 
to exploit the policy change in 2009 – however since the policy change was universal we do 
not have a control group who did not experience the policy change and hence cannot use a 
difference-in-differences approach. We therefore compare models before and after the policy 
change using Natsal2 prior to the policy change, and Natsal3 after the policy change. We also 
in some cases compare the 25-44 Natsal2 sample with a sample of men aged 35-54 (so the 
same age cohort from 2000-2001) in Natsal3 (sample size 1,478). 
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Adjusting means for the sample weights (so our estimates are representative of the UK 
population), the proportion of men (aged 25-44) reporting having ever paid for sex in Natsal 2 
was 10.91% (unweighted 12.44) in Natsal2 and 13.05% (unweighted 13.37%) in Natsal3.   
4.64% (unweighted 6.04%) of men aged 25-44 had paid in the last 5 years in Natsal2 and 4.57% 
(unweighted 5.24%) in Natsal3. If we concentrate on men aged 35-54 in Natsal 3 this is 3.57% 
(unweighted 4.41%), so the recent demand for this cohort has decreased, but it is not possible 
to say if this is due to the policy or an ageing effect. Overall the proportion having ever paid 
for sex has increased. 
As for the type of client, in Natsal2 4.92% (unweighted 5.31%) were experimenters and 
6.00% (unweighted 7.29%) regulars compared to 4.43% (unweighted 4.89%) experimenters 
and 8.58% (unweighted 8.85%) regulars in Natsal3. This suggest that the proportion of 
experimenters has fallen between Natsal2 and Natsal3 but the proportion of regulars has 
increased slightly. 
 
SARAH PLEASE CAN YOU DO THESE 4 TABLES 
Table 2 EVER PAID in Natsal 2 and 3: percentages and numbers ever paid for sex 
for the different samples (weighted and unweighted) with significant differences 
highlighted (test) 
Table 3 EVER PAID by Client type in Natsal 2 and 3: percentages and numbers  ever 
paid for sex for the paid for one partner and paid for many partners in the different 
samples (weighted and unweighted) with significant differences highlighted (test) 
Table 4 PAID IN LAST 5 YEARS in Natsal 2 and 3: percentages and numbers  paid 
for sex in last 5 years for the paid for one partner and paid for many partners in the 
different samples (weighted and unweighted) with significant differences highlighted 
(test) 
Table 6 PAID IN LAST 5 YEARS by Client type in Natsal 2 and 3:  percentages and 
numbers paid for sex in last five years for the paid for one partner and paid for many 
partners in the different samples (weighted and unweighted) with significant differences 
highlighted (test) 
 
 
4.2 Results 
We run two models of the demand for sex, to see how the probability of paying for sex is 
related to different respondents’ characteristics: 
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1) Paid for sex within the last five years (probit model) 
2) Multinomial probit model of client types (never paid, experimenter and regular) 
We report the marginal effects and the standard errors. While one can interpret the sign 
and significance of the coefficients of a (multinomial) probit model, the magnitude of the raw 
coefficients are not intuitive, therefore we report average marginal effects (an average across 
marginal effects for each individual), which provide the effect of a change in an explanatory 
variable on the probability of demanding for sex (and each of the categories for the MNP).   
We now concentrate on demand in the last five years (Table 1) in the two samples, 
including sociodemographic controls to investigate the roles of education and stigma, the 
substitution between paid and unpaid sex, and the effect of attitudes and risky behaviours on 
demand. In particular we include: age dummies, current marital status (currently married, 
currently cohabiting, previously married/cohabiting), number of natural children (including 
stillborn and children who have died), ethnicity (white versus non-white), education (degree, 
A-level, O-level or none), socio-economic background (using the 2000 occupational definition 
for consistency between Natsal2 and Natsal3), whether religious, whether have conservative 
views (sex between two men is always/mostly wrong; one-night stands are always/mostly 
wrong; adultery whilst married is always/mostly wrong), alcohol consumption (none, low, 
moderate/high), smoking (non-smoker, ex-smoker, light smoker, heavy smoker), whether had 
unsafe sex in last year, whether ever inject drugs, age first had intercourse (those who have 
never had sex are omitted- 126 in Natsal2 and 74 in Natsal3), region (North East and North 
West combined with Yorkshire, West and East Midlands combined). Table A1 in the appendix 
presents the means of our variables by client type (unweighted) to assess changes in relative 
proportions within each wave. Table 1 reports models of demand measured by ‘whether paid 
for sex in last 5 years’, comparing Natsal2 and 3 for the age range 25-44 and also Natsal3 
restricted to the 25+, Natsal3 with income (which was sadly not included in Natsal2) and 
Natsal3 for the 34-54 sample (those who were therefore 25-44 at the time of Natsal2). We 
report weighted results in the appendix for robustness (results are not altered). 
 
Table : Paid for sex in last 5 years (unweighted)  THIS TABLE COULD GO IN 
APPENDIX 
  
Natsal2 
25-44 
Natsal3 
25-44 
Natsal3 
25-44 - 
income 
Natsal3 
25+ 
Natsal3 
35-54 
Age group (ref: 25-34)         
Aged 35-44 -0.000 0.001 0.003 0.002  
 [0.009] [0.011] [0.011] [0.009]  
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Aged 45-54    -0.001 -0.002 
    [0.010] [0.011] 
Aged 55-64    0.001  
    [0.011]  
aged 65-74    -0.020  
    [0.015]  
Marital status (single and never married/cohabiting)  
Currently married -0.051*** -0.061*** -0.066*** -0.054*** -0.045** 
 [0.012] [0.015] [0.016] [0.010] [0.020] 
Currently cohabiting -0.058*** -0.068*** -0.073*** -0.067*** -0.071** 
 [0.014] [0.017] [0.018] [0.013] [0.029] 
Previously married/cohabiting -0.013 0.007 0.007 -0.011 -0.013 
 [0.011] [0.013] [0.013] [0.009] [0.020] 
Number of natural children (incl. stillborn and 
died) -0.009** -0.009 -0.008 -0.006** -0.006 
 [0.004] [0.006] [0.006] [0.003] [0.004] 
White -0.004 -0.024 -0.027* -0.028*** -0.021 
 [0.012] [0.015] [0.015] [0.011] [0.018] 
Highest Qualification (ref: None)    
Degree 0.021 0.011 0.007 0.013 0.032 
 [0.015] [0.019] [0.019] [0.012] [0.020] 
A-level or equiv. 0.022 0.009 0.006 0.021* 0.051** 
 [0.015] [0.020] [0.020] [0.012] [0.021] 
O-level or equivalent 0.012 0.008 0.007 0.018* 0.023 
 [0.012] [0.017] [0.017] [0.010] [0.017] 
Socio-economic class (ref: elementary, process, service and never worked) 
Managers and senior officials 0.009 0.021 0.018 0.018* 0.033** 
 [0.012] [0.016] [0.016] [0.010] [0.015] 
Professional -0.016 0.005 0.001 0.012 -0.022 
 [0.016] [0.018] [0.019] [0.012] [0.023] 
Associate professional/administration 0.003 0.020 0.017 0.007 0.006 
 [0.012] [0.014] [0.014] [0.009] [0.016] 
Skilled trade -0.007 0.018 0.018 0.004 0.008 
 [0.012] [0.014] [0.014] [0.010] [0.016] 
Conservative Opinions     
Religious 0.002 0.023** 0.025** 0.012* 0.018 
 [0.008] [0.010] [0.010] [0.007] [0.011] 
Sex between two men mostly/always wrong 0.008 0.028*** 0.028*** 0.012* 0.029** 
 [0.008] [0.010] [0.010] [0.007] [0.012] 
One-night stands mostly/always wrong -0.035*** -0.002 -0.001 -0.007 -0.011 
 [0.010] [0.011] [0.011] [0.007] [0.011] 
Adultery whilst married mostly/always wrong -0.014 -0.026** -0.029** -0.024*** -0.030** 
 [0.009] [0.012] [0.012] [0.007] [0.012] 
Risky Behaviour     
Average weekly alcohol consumption (ref: none)]   
Low -0.024* 0.020 0.018 0.018* 0.017 
 [0.012] [0.014] [0.014] [0.009] [0.014] 
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Moderate/high -0.011 0.026 0.023 0.030** 0.016 
 [0.015] [0.019] [0.019] [0.012] [0.019] 
Smoking (ref: never smoked)    
Ex-smoker -0.004 -0.023 -0.021 -0.003 -0.013 
 [0.012] [0.015] [0.015] [0.008] [0.014] 
Light smoker 0.006 0.006 0.009 0.005 0.008 
 [0.011] [0.012] [0.012] [0.009] [0.015] 
Heavy smoker 0.014 0.013 0.017 0.002 0.008 
 [0.011] [0.015] [0.015] [0.010] [0.016] 
Unsafe sex in last year=1 0.066*** 0.031** 0.036** 0.039*** 0.015 
 [0.010] [0.015] [0.015] [0.009] [0.016] 
Ever injected drugs==1 0.035** 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.030 
 [0.017] [0.027] [0.027] [0.021] [0.030] 
Age first had intercourse (ref: 16-17)    
Aged 13-15 0.008 0.027** 0.026** 0.023*** 0.023* 
 [0.010] [0.012] [0.012] [0.008] [0.013] 
Aged 18-19 0.001 -0.007 -0.006 0.005 0.006 
 [0.011] [0.014] [0.014] [0.009] [0.015] 
Aged 20+ 0.016 -0.008 -0.007 -0.008 -0.010 
 [0.012] [0.016] [0.016] [0.011] [0.018] 
Region (ref: North and Yorkshire)    
Midlands 0.013 -0.032* -0.033* -0.009 -0.010 
 [0.013] [0.018] [0.018] [0.010] [0.016] 
East 0.012 0.010 0.007 0.008 0.002 
 [0.017] [0.017] [0.017] [0.011] [0.017] 
London 0.027** 0.009 0.007 0.009 0.012 
 [0.012] [0.016] [0.016] [0.011] [0.019] 
South East -0.014 0.020 0.018 0.021** -0.004 
 [0.016] [0.015] [0.015] [0.010] [0.017] 
South West 0.000 0.007 0.002 -0.003 -0.018 
 [0.018] [0.020] [0.020] [0.013] [0.023] 
Wales -0.029 0.020 0.020 -0.005 -0.053 
 [0.026] [0.022] [0.022] [0.016] [0.036] 
Scotland -0.032 0.017 0.016 0.010 -0.014 
 [0.021] [0.017] [0.017] [0.012] [0.022] 
Income group (ref: <10,000)      
10,000-19,999  -0.014   
   [0.020]   
20,000-29,999  0.003   
   [0.019]   
30,000-39,999  0.035*   
   [0.019]   
40,000-49,000  0.034*   
   [0.021]   
50,000+   0.014   
   [0.020]   
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Not answered  0.029   
   [0.019]   
      
Observations 3,523 2,149 2,149 4,119 1478 
Log likelihood -699.6 -383.6 -377.9 -660.1 -228.2 
LR Chi2 214.5 130 141.4 189.6 70.65 
pseudo r-squared 0.133 0.145 0.158 0.126 0.134 
Standard errors in brackets     
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1    
 
In addition to changes in the quantity demanded, at least by our measures, there is also a 
change in its composition: we find that having partners and children is inversely related to 
having paid for sex in both samples, but clients are likely to be older in Natsal3. Socio-
economic status is not significant in Natsal2 and becomes significant for managers and senior 
officials in Natsal 3, and we find a weak effect of ethnicity, a significant and positive effect of 
religion and holding conservative views (except for adultery), no effect of risky sex or drug use 
and no London or regional effects (apart from a weak negative association with the Midlands) 
on demand after the policy changes.  
Although demand overall has not changed much, clients have. To delve a little more into 
this, we also separate clients in the three groups of those who have never paid for sex, those 
who have had just one paid partner  (whom we label), and those who have had several paid 
partners (whom we label). Table 4 presents a Multinomial probit model of client types, with 
average marginal effects (an average across marginal effects for each individual), which 
provide the effect of a change in an explanatory variable on each of the categories.   
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Table 4: Non clients, one paid partner,many paid partners(Unweighted) 
  Natsal 2 Natsal3 
  never paid      
Age group (ref: 25-34)       
Aged 35-44 -0.044*** 0.004 0.040*** -0.019 -0.019* 0.039*** 
 [0.012] [0.008] [0.009] [0.017] [0.011] [0.014] 
Marital status (single and never married/cohabiting)   
Currently married 0.022 0.003 -0.025* 0.022 -0.013 -0.009 
 [0.018] [0.013] [0.014] [0.023] [0.015] [0.020] 
Currently cohabiting 0.058*** -0.003 -0.055*** 0.084*** -0.050*** -0.034 
 [0.021] [0.014] [0.017] [0.026] [0.017] [0.021] 
Previously married/cohabiting 0.006 0.010 -0.015 -0.003 0.001 0.002 
 [0.017] [0.012] [0.013] [0.023] [0.014] [0.019] 
Number of natural children (incl. stillborn and died) 0.017*** -0.008* -0.009** 0.014* -0.005 -0.009 
 [0.006] [0.004] [0.004] [0.008] [0.005] [0.007] 
White 0.015 0.009 -0.024* 0.051** -0.006 -0.045** 
 [0.017] [0.012] [0.013] [0.024] [0.015] [0.020] 
Highest Qualification (ref: None)     
Degree -0.054*** 0.021 0.033** 0.020 0.000 -0.020 
 [0.021] [0.014] [0.016] [0.029] [0.019] [0.024] 
A-level or equiv. -0.072*** 0.033** 0.039** 0.000 0.005 -0.005 
 [0.021] [0.014] [0.017] [0.030] [0.020] [0.025] 
O-level or equivalent -0.033* 0.011 0.022 0.002 0.006 -0.008 
 [0.017] [0.012] [0.013] [0.025] [0.016] [0.020] 
Socio-economic class (ref: elementary, process, service and never worked) 
Managers and senior officials 0.002 -0.004 0.003 -0.024 0.001 0.022 
 [0.017] [0.012] [0.013] [0.024] [0.016] [0.020] 
Professional 0.027 -0.018 -0.009 0.016 -0.009 -0.007 
 [0.022] [0.016] [0.017] [0.029] [0.019] [0.025] 
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Associate professional/administration -0.005 0.010 -0.004 -0.032 0.015 0.017 
 [0.017] [0.011] [0.013] [0.021] [0.013] [0.018] 
Skilled trade 0.000 0.007 -0.007 -0.035 0.017 0.018 
 [0.016] [0.011] [0.013] [0.021] [0.013] [0.018] 
Conservative Opinions      
Religious -0.020* 0.016** 0.003 -0.035** 0.007 0.028** 
 [0.012] [0.008] [0.009] [0.016] [0.010] [0.013] 
Sex between two men mostly/always wrong -0.019 0.007 0.012 -0.001 -0.010 0.011 
 [0.012] [0.008] [0.009] [0.016] [0.011] [0.013] 
One-night stands mostly/always wrong 0.078*** -0.027*** -0.051*** 0.034** -0.002 -0.033** 
 [0.013] [0.009] [0.011] [0.017] [0.011] [0.014] 
Adultery whilst married mostly/always wrong 0.009 -0.006 -0.003 0.071*** -0.018 -0.053*** 
 [0.013] [0.009] [0.010] [0.019] [0.012] [0.015] 
Risky Behaviour      
Average weekly alcohol consumption (ref: none)]   
Low 0.024 -0.015 -0.009 -0.043** 0.004 0.040** 
 [0.018] [0.012] [0.014] [0.020] [0.013] [0.017] 
Moderate/high -0.006 -0.012 0.018 -0.081*** 0.004 0.077*** 
 [0.022] [0.015] [0.017] [0.029] [0.019] [0.024] 
Smoking (ref: never smoked)     
Ex-smoker -0.009 -0.017 0.026** -0.018 0.031** -0.013 
 [0.016] [0.012] [0.012] [0.020] [0.012] [0.017] 
Light smoker -0.018 0.016 0.002 -0.036* 0.020 0.016 
 [0.015] [0.010] [0.012] [0.019] [0.012] [0.016] 
Heavy smoker -0.031** 0.025** 0.006 -0.048** 0.011 0.037** 
 [0.015] [0.010] [0.012] [0.024] [0.016] [0.019] 
Unsafe sex in last year -0.095*** 0.030*** 0.065*** -0.013 -0.009 0.022 
 [0.015] [0.010] [0.011] [0.027] [0.019] [0.021] 
Ever injected drugs -0.044* 0.000 0.044** -0.064 0.037* 0.026 
 [0.026] [0.019] [0.019] [0.039] [0.023] [0.033] 
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Age first had intercourse (ref: 16-17)    
Aged 13-15 -0.051*** 0.007 0.044*** -0.050*** 0.007 0.043*** 
 [0.014] [0.009] [0.011] [0.018] [0.011] [0.015] 
Aged 18-19 -0.005 -0.013 0.018 0.006 -0.008 0.002 
 [0.016] [0.011] [0.012] [0.021] [0.013] [0.017] 
Aged 20+ -0.010 -0.016 0.027* 0.066** -0.037** -0.029 
 [0.018] [0.013] [0.014] [0.027] [0.018] [0.023] 
Region (ref: North and Yorkshire)     
Midlands 0.000 0.004 -0.004 0.030 0.000 -0.031 
 [0.019] [0.013] [0.015] [0.024] [0.016] [0.020] 
East 0.011 0.003 -0.014 -0.001 0.021 -0.020 
 [0.025] [0.017] [0.020] [0.027] [0.017] [0.023] 
London -0.030* 0.013 0.017 -0.055** 0.039** 0.016 
 [0.016] [0.011] [0.013] [0.025] [0.016] [0.021] 
South East 0.028 -0.001 -0.027 -0.038 0.027* 0.011 
 [0.021] [0.014] [0.017] [0.024] [0.015] [0.020] 
South West -0.003 -0.020 0.023 0.007 0.018 -0.024 
 [0.024] [0.018] [0.018] [0.030] [0.019] [0.026] 
Wales 0.049 -0.009 -0.040 -0.027 -0.004 0.031 
 [0.033] [0.022] [0.028] [0.036] [0.027] [0.028] 
Scotland 0.047* -0.018 -0.029 -0.039 0.023 0.016 
 [0.026] [0.018] [0.021] [0.028] [0.018] [0.023] 
Observations 3,523 3,523 3,523 2,147 2,147 2,147 
Log likelihood -1499 -1499 -1499 -965.3 -965.3 -965.3 
LR Chi2 249.1 249.1 249.1 157.3 157.3 157.3 
Standard errors in brackets     
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Clients after the policy change are more likely (as compared to Natsal2) to have many 
partners, be older, religious, consume alcohol and to have had intercourse at a younger age. 
Those who have just paid for one partner are fewer, not cohabiting, more likely to be ex-
smokers and more likely to be in London. 
All in all, although of course we cannot establish causal links we can certainly observe that 
after the policy change in 2009 demand has, if anything, slightly increased and the profile of 
clients has changed to one who paid for many partners, that also have a risky profile that raises 
concerns (alcohol use and intercourse at early age), and has been discussed in the context of 
public health in Jones et al (2014).  
 
Conclusions 
 
As economists, we believe that public policy ought to be based on relative welfare 
considerations. In other words, under which arrangements are the actors, and the public, better 
off? From this point of view, prostitution does not lend itself easily to being classed as a crime. 
Regulation exists on a wide spectrum, with different modes and degrees of criminalisation, 
decriminalisation and legalisation, and debates about its appropriateness are not necessarily 
based on reliable evidence. Criminalisation typically hopes to quash demand, but the evidence 
is mixed, and ours contradictory.  
Criminalisation affects also risk, though. Sex workers, or prostitutes, face risks to their 
health, risks of violent assault, and risk of fraud (not getting paid for their services). Clients 
face also health risks, reputational risks and, where prostitution occurs in criminal 
environments, risks of violence too. These risks are going to be higher where prostitution is 
criminalised, partly because criminalisation makes collaboration with both medical personnel 
and law enforcement more difficult. Criminalisation of sex work also makes the detection of 
under-age or trafficked people more difficult. Perhaps surprisingly, research on sexually 
exploited trafficked women (Di Tommaso et al., 2009) shows that women who work in the 
streets are in some ways better off than sex workers in parlours, clubs or hotels. Street workers 
enjoy more freedom of movement, suffer less physical and sexual abuse, and are more likely 
to have access to health services than women who work in parlours, clubs or hotels. For both 
clients and for sex workers, demand-side and supply-side, criminalisation pushes the market 
into secluded and, for the workers, isolating places. Flats, clubs and massage parlours are more 
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separate from the rest of society. The welfare of sexually trafficked women decreases in these 
dangerous environments. 
Our analysis of the move towards criminalisation in the UK suggests that this has not 
decreased demand and possibly changed the profile of clients in ways that may worry those 
who are concerned about the welfare of prostitutes as well as public health. By and large, clients 
of sex workers tend to be risk-takers. There is a high correlation between paying for sex and 
engaging in other risky behaviours. To many men, criminalised prostitution is actually more 
attractive than decriminalised or legal sex work. From what we can see, pushing prostitution 
into the shadows not only makes sex work more dangerous, it actually increases demand. As 
more countries follow the model of criminalisation it will become possible to have a more 
careful assessment of its effects on welfare, but the case for it is certainly not clear cut. 
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Appendix 
 
Table a1: Descriptives of demand in Natsal2 and Natsal3 
 
  Natsal2 Natsal3 
Variable 
Never 
paid 
Experim
enters 
Regu
lars 
Never 
paid 
Experim
enters 
Regu
lars 
Age group      
25-34 0.51 0.55 0.45 0.65 0.75 0.59 
35-44 0.49 0.45 0.55 0.35 0.25 0.41 
Marital status      
Currently married 0.48 0.37 0.37 0.42 0.35 0.37 
Currently cohabiting 0.16 0.14 0.09 0.22 0.10 0.15 
Previously married/cohabiting 0.23 0.33 0.33 0.21 0.32 0.31 
Single and never married 0.14 0.16 0.22 0.16 0.22 0.18 
number of natural children (incl. 
stillborn and died) 1.20 0.87 0.87 0.91 0.70 0.87 
White 0.85 0.84 0.79 0.87 0.85 0.83 
exams2       
Degree 0.27 0.28 0.33 0.35 0.31 0.28 
A level 0.11 0.17 0.15 0.14 0.16 0.15 
O-level 0.43 0.40 0.39 0.41 0.42 0.43 
none 0.18 0.15 0.13 0.10 0.10 0.14 
Social economic background     
Managers and senior officials 0.19 0.18 0.21 0.15 0.14 0.16 
Professional 0.12 0.07 0.12 0.14 0.08 0.08 
Associate 
professional/administration 0.19 0.24 0.21 0.21 0.27 0.23 
Skilled trade 0.20 0.21 0.17 0.17 0.22 0.20 
elementary, process, service 
and never worked 0.31 0.29 0.30 0.33 0.30 0.33 
Religious 0.44 0.48 0.45 0.38 0.41 0.44 
Sex between two men 
mostly/always wrong 0.54 0.53 0.53 0.54 0.34 0.39 
One-night stands mostly/always 
wrong 0.38 0.23 0.20 0.35 0.27 0.23 
Adultery whilst married 
mostly/always wrong 0.81 0.76 0.75 0.88 0.80 0.75 
Alcohol       
None 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.20 0.17 0.14 
Low 0.74 0.70 0.67 0.72 0.73 0.71 
Moderate/high 0.13 0.18 0.21 0.08 0.10 0.15 
smoking       
non-smoker 0.46 0.37 0.39 0.50 0.33 0.39 
ex-smoker 0.17 0.11 0.23 0.19 0.27 0.16 
light smoker 0.18 0.24 0.19 0.21 0.29 0.26 
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heavy smoker 0.20 0.28 0.20 0.11 0.11 0.18 
Unsafe sex in last year 0.10 0.21 0.27 0.06 0.07 0.11 
Ever injected drugs 0.03 0.04 0.07 0.02 0.06 0.04 
Age first had intercourse     
13-15 0.25 0.33 0.35 0.27 0.34 0.43 
16-17 0.39 0.39 0.28 0.36 0.40 0.31 
18-19 0.20 0.17 0.21 0.21 0.19 0.18 
20+ 0.16 0.11 0.16 0.16 0.07 0.08 
Region       
North and. 0.21 0.20 0.19 0.28 0.21 0.29 
Midlands 0.15 0.15 0.13 0.18 0.11 0.12 
Eastern 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.10 0.11 0.08 
London 0.26 0.36 0.41 0.10 0.21 0.15 
South East 0.12 0.11 0.07 0.12 0.15 0.14 
South West 0.07 0.04 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.06 
Wales 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.06 
Scotland 0.08 0.05 0.04 0.08 0.10 0.10 
       
No of obs. 3,079 187 257 1,852 105 190 
 
 
Table a2: Paid for sex in last 5 years (Weighted Version) 
  
Natsal2 
25-44 
Natsal3 
25-44 
Natsal3 
25-44 - 
income 
Natsal3 
25+ 
Natsal3 
35-54 
Age group (ref: 25-34)         
Aged 35-44 0.001 -0.003 -0.002 -0.000  
 [0.007] [0.011] [0.011] [0.009]  
Aged 45-54    0.022 -0.001 
    [0.017] [0.018] 
Aged 55-64    0.041**  
    [0.019]  
aged 65-74    0.016  
    [0.023]  
Marital status (single and never married/cohabiting)  
Currently married -0.032*** -0.053*** -0.056*** -0.045*** -0.031* 
 [0.010] [0.014] [0.014] [0.009] [0.017] 
Currently cohabiting -0.038*** -0.061*** -0.064*** -0.059*** -0.052** 
 [0.012] [0.015] [0.015] [0.012] [0.021] 
Previously married/cohabiting -0.002 0.003 0.004 -0.010 -0.005 
 [0.011] [0.012] [0.012] [0.009] [0.017] 
Number of natural children (incl. stillborn and 
died) -0.009** -0.006 -0.005 -0.006** -0.007* 
 [0.004] [0.005] [0.005] [0.002] [0.004] 
White 0.008 -0.024* -0.026* -0.030*** -0.031** 
 [0.010] [0.014] [0.014] [0.010] [0.015] 
Highest Qualification (ref: None)    
Degree 0.021 0.020 0.017 0.010 0.025 
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 [0.013] [0.017] [0.017] [0.011] [0.018] 
A-level or equiv. 0.021 0.024 0.022 0.023* 0.039** 
 [0.014] [0.019] [0.018] [0.012] [0.019] 
O-level or equivalent 0.011 0.017 0.017 0.015 0.022 
 [0.010] [0.016] [0.016] [0.009] [0.016] 
Socio-economic class (ref: elementary, process, service and never worked) 
Managers and senior officials 0.004 0.008 0.004 0.016* 0.031** 
 [0.011] [0.014] [0.015] [0.010] [0.014] 
Professional -0.020 0.003 -0.002 0.010 -0.016 
 [0.015] [0.017] [0.017] [0.011] [0.018] 
Associate professional/administration -0.003 0.015 0.011 0.004 0.008 
 [0.010] [0.013] [0.013] [0.009] [0.013] 
Skilled trade -0.004 0.001 0.000 -0.002 -0.001 
 [0.010] [0.014] [0.014] [0.009] [0.014] 
Conservative Opinions     
Religious 0.009 0.016* 0.018** 0.009 0.014 
 [0.008] [0.009] [0.009] [0.006] [0.009] 
Sex between two men mostly/always wrong 0.005 0.030*** 0.030*** 0.010 0.025*** 
 [0.008] [0.010] [0.010] [0.006] [0.009] 
One-night stands mostly/always wrong -0.024*** -0.006 -0.006 -0.009 -0.011 
 [0.009] [0.010] [0.010] [0.007] [0.010] 
Adultery whilst married mostly/always wrong -0.011 -0.025** -0.027** -0.021*** -0.021** 
 [0.008] [0.012] [0.012] [0.007] [0.011] 
Risky Behaviour     
Average weekly alcohol consumption (ref: none)]   
Low -0.023** 0.014 0.012 0.012 0.015 
 [0.011] [0.012] [0.012] [0.008] [0.011] 
Moderate/high -0.008 0.010 0.007 0.020* 0.015 
 [0.013] [0.017] [0.017] [0.011] [0.016] 
Smoking (ref: never smoked)    
Ex-smoker -0.004 -0.023 -0.022 -0.005 -0.012 
 [0.012] [0.015] [0.015] [0.008] [0.013] 
Light smoker 0.010 0.003 0.004 -0.000 -0.002 
 [0.010] [0.011] [0.011] [0.008] [0.012] 
Heavy smoker 0.010 0.021 0.024 0.002 0.008 
 [0.009] [0.016] [0.016] [0.011] [0.015] 
Unsafe sex in last year=1 0.065*** 0.019 0.021 0.043*** 0.022 
 [0.010] [0.014] [0.014] [0.010] [0.016] 
Ever injected drugs==1 0.025 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 0.023 
 [0.017] [0.025] [0.025] [0.018] [0.021] 
Age first had intercourse (ref: 16-17)    
Aged 13-15 0.002 0.027** 0.026** 0.024*** 0.026** 
 [0.009] [0.011] [0.011] [0.008] [0.011] 
Aged 18-19 -0.009 0.000 0.002 0.008 0.007 
 [0.010] [0.013] [0.013] [0.008] [0.012] 
Aged 20+ 0.017 -0.017 -0.016 -0.007 -0.012 
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 [0.011] [0.015] [0.015] [0.010] [0.015] 
Region (ref: North and Yorkshire)    
Midlands 0.012 -0.038** -0.039** -0.007 -0.012 
 [0.011] [0.016] [0.016] [0.009] [0.014] 
East 0.009 0.004 0.000 0.001 -0.004 
 [0.016] [0.016] [0.016] [0.010] [0.015] 
London 0.026*** 0.002 0.000 0.005 0.007 
 [0.010] [0.016] [0.015] [0.011] [0.017] 
South East -0.009 0.011 0.010 0.019** -0.000 
 [0.013] [0.015] [0.014] [0.009] [0.015] 
South West 0.004 0.001 -0.002 -0.006 -0.024 
 [0.016] [0.017] [0.017] [0.012] [0.018] 
Wales -0.014 -0.010 -0.009 -0.021 -0.056* 
 [0.021] [0.019] [0.019] [0.015] [0.030] 
Scotland -0.018 0.012 0.012 0.011 -0.002 
 [0.018] [0.017] [0.017] [0.012] [0.017] 
Income group (ref: <10,000)      
10,000-19,999  -0.014   
   [0.020]   
20,000-29,999  -0.005   
   [0.018]   
30,000-39,999  0.017   
   [0.018]   
40,000-49,000  0.011   
   [0.020]   
50,000+   0.013   
   [0.021]   
Not answered  0.014   
   [0.018]   
      
Observations 3,523 2,149 2,149 4,119 1478 
Log likelihood -682.1 -407.9 -405.1 -790.6 -344.8 
LR Chi2 226.4 172.7 191.6 214.3 90.7 
pseudo r-squared 0.147 0.151 0.157 0.14 0.147 
Standard errors in brackets     
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1    
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Table a3: Regulars and Experimenters  (Weighted Version) 
  Natsal 2 Natsal3 
  never paid experimenter regular never paid experimenter regular 
Age group (ref: 25-34)       
Aged 35-44 -0.041*** 0.001 0.040*** -0.022 -0.014 0.036** 
 [0.012] [0.009] [0.009] [0.018] [0.010] [0.016] 
Marital status (single and never married/cohabiting)   
Currently married 0.011 0.002 -0.013 0.030 -0.011 -0.019 
 [0.018] [0.013] [0.013] [0.024] [0.014] [0.021] 
Currently cohabiting 0.039* -0.003 -0.036** 0.086*** -0.051*** -0.036 
 [0.020] [0.014] [0.016] [0.026] [0.016] [0.022] 
Previously married/cohabiting -0.005 0.010 -0.005 -0.002 0.008 -0.006 
 [0.018] [0.013] [0.013] [0.024] [0.014] [0.021] 
Number of natural children (incl. stillborn and died) 0.017*** -0.010** -0.007* 0.015** -0.004 -0.011 
 [0.006] [0.004] [0.004] [0.007] [0.004] [0.007] 
White 0.005 0.007 -0.012 0.069*** -0.022 -0.048** 
 [0.017] [0.012] [0.012] [0.025] [0.015] [0.021] 
Highest Qualification (ref: None)     
Degree -0.034 0.009 0.025 0.002 -0.006 0.004 
 [0.021] [0.015] [0.017] [0.030] [0.016] [0.026] 
A-level or equiv. -0.057** 0.026* 0.031* -0.016 0.011 0.005 
 [0.022] [0.015] [0.017] [0.031] [0.018] [0.026] 
O-level or equivalent -0.027 0.012 0.015 -0.010 0.003 0.007 
 [0.017] [0.012] [0.013] [0.025] [0.014] [0.022] 
Socio-economic class (ref: elementary, process, service and never worked) 
Managers and senior officials -0.006 0.004 0.001 0.010 -0.002 -0.008 
 [0.017] [0.013] [0.013] [0.025] [0.015] [0.021] 
Professional 0.019 -0.012 -0.007 0.003 0.004 -0.008 
 [0.023] [0.016] [0.018] [0.031] [0.019] [0.027] 
Associate professional/administration 0.001 0.005 -0.005 -0.027 0.023* 0.004 
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 [0.017] [0.012] [0.013] [0.022] [0.013] [0.019] 
Skilled trade -0.008 0.010 -0.002 -0.011 0.007 0.005 
 [0.016] [0.011] [0.012] [0.022] [0.012] [0.019] 
Conservative Opinions      
Religious -0.032*** 0.022** 0.010 -0.022 -0.004 0.026* 
 [0.012] [0.009] [0.009] [0.016] [0.009] [0.013] 
Sex between two men mostly/always wrong -0.009 0.003 0.006 -0.005 -0.012 0.017 
 [0.012] [0.008] [0.008] [0.017] [0.010] [0.014] 
One-night stands mostly/always wrong 0.075*** -0.033*** -0.042*** 0.044** -0.003 -0.041** 
 [0.013] [0.009] [0.010] [0.018] [0.010] [0.016] 
Adultery whilst married mostly/always wrong 0.006 -0.001 -0.005 0.070*** -0.013 -0.056*** 
 [0.013] [0.009] [0.010] [0.020] [0.012] [0.017] 
Risky Behaviour      
Average weekly alcohol consumption (ref: none)]   
Low 0.021 -0.012 -0.009 -0.050** 0.010 0.040** 
 [0.018] [0.013] [0.014] [0.021] [0.012] [0.018] 
Moderate/high -0.006 -0.008 0.014 -0.074** 0.008 0.066*** 
 [0.022] [0.016] [0.017] [0.030] [0.018] [0.025] 
Smoking (ref: never smoked)     
Ex-smoker -0.006 -0.012 0.019* -0.036* 0.028** 0.008 
 [0.017] [0.013] [0.011] [0.022] [0.012] [0.019] 
Light smoker -0.014 0.009 0.006 -0.023 0.015 0.008 
 [0.016] [0.011] [0.012] [0.020] [0.012] [0.016] 
Heavy smoker -0.021 0.022** -0.001 -0.060** 0.009 0.051** 
 [0.016] [0.011] [0.012] [0.026] [0.015] [0.022] 
Unsafe sex in last year -0.098*** 0.036*** 0.062*** -0.001 -0.011 0.013 
 [0.016] [0.011] [0.012] [0.030] [0.020] [0.023] 
Ever injected drugs -0.048* -0.008 0.056*** -0.058 0.051** 0.007 
 [0.028] [0.019] [0.020] [0.041] [0.023] [0.035] 
Age first had intercourse (ref: 16-17)    
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Aged 13-15 -0.043*** 0.005 0.038*** -0.053*** 0.012 0.041*** 
 [0.014] [0.009] [0.011] [0.018] [0.011] [0.016] 
Aged 18-19 0.005 -0.009 0.005 0.018 -0.016 -0.002 
 [0.016] [0.012] [0.012] [0.021] [0.012] [0.018] 
Aged 20+ -0.010 -0.013 0.023* 0.108*** -0.055*** -0.054** 
 [0.017] [0.012] [0.013] [0.028] [0.018] [0.024] 
Region (ref: North and Yorkshire)     
Midlands 0.001 0.003 -0.004 0.032 -0.004 -0.028 
 [0.018] [0.012] [0.014] [0.024] [0.014] [0.021] 
East 0.016 -0.001 -0.015 -0.006 0.028* -0.022 
 [0.024] [0.017] [0.018] [0.027] [0.015] [0.024] 
London -0.029* 0.015 0.014 -0.040 0.039** 0.002 
 [0.015] [0.011] [0.011] [0.026] [0.015] [0.023] 
South East 0.022 0.006 -0.028* -0.044* 0.035** 0.009 
 [0.019] [0.014] [0.015] [0.026] [0.015] [0.022] 
South West -0.007 -0.013 0.020 0.017 0.022 -0.038 
 [0.023] [0.018] [0.015] [0.031] [0.018] [0.026] 
Wales 0.046 -0.016 -0.030 0.009 -0.008 -0.000 
 [0.031] [0.021] [0.025] [0.038] [0.023] [0.031] 
Scotland 0.047** -0.023 -0.024 -0.036 0.036** -0.000 
 [0.024] [0.017] [0.018] [0.029] [0.018] [0.024] 
Observations 3,523 3,523 3,523 2,147 2,147 2,147 
Log likelihood -1628 -1628 -1628 -1092 -1092 -1092 
LR Chi2 272.2 272.2 272.2 205.9 205.9 205.9 
Standard errors in brackets     
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
 
